Kantian constitutivism and the limits of agency

Abstract

The philosophical method referred to as constitutivism regards some norms as constitutive of the active exercise of a particular capacity. The distinctive feature of Korsgaard’s Self-Constitution Constitutivism (SCC) is the way that it explains and justifies normativity. The SCC theory treats the principle of practical reason as constitutive of the capacity for agency.

While I take the SCC theory to be an ingenious attempt at providing an explanatory and justificatory ground for moral and non-moral normativity, the account it provides has come under criticism both from inside and outside the Kantian tradition. Those inside the Kantian tradition often criticize the view for its tendentious interpretation of practical reason. Those outside the Kantian tradition often criticize the view for offering an account of normativity that is insufficient to ground anything like categorical moral authority.

As a Kantian, with broadly sympathetic constructivist leanings, I aim to answer the criticisms of those from outside the Kantian tradition by taking on board the criticisms of Kantians. Specifically, I address three core problems and themes. First, I look to the problem of motivational ambivalence. Second, I discuss the relational theory of value. And, third, I discuss the objection that constitutivism provides insufficient ground for categorical moral authority.

I conclude by making a few suggestions that allow philosophers of different types to move past these debates. First, for philosophers who align with the SCC theory, I suggest that, instead of speaking of a unified capacity for rational agency, the theory would be better served by speaking of several capacities, each with their own rationally structured function. Second, for Kantians more broadly, I show what role constitutivism is playing in Kant’s practical philosophy. From this, it becomes clear that constitutivism cannot answer all metaethical questions.