Aggregating value. Trade-offs, thresholds, and total goodness in lives

Abstract

I present my research on value aggregation. It aims to provide new answers to questions about value aggregation. In particular, after examining and proposing new objections to some prominent answers to the challenges of population ethics, I propose a theory of population value that posits a “neutral range” of wellbeing levels. I call this theory the Structured Range View. The Structured Range View ranks populations by summing the total wellbeing outside this range, and then giving specific rules for which populations it is permissible to create within the range.

The thesis also explores three new theoretical puzzles for aggregation. The first is that theories rejecting transitivity of “better than” struggle to handle cases of partial information. The second is what I call “the Monstrous Conclusion”, a version of Nozick’s Utility Monster specifically for population ethics. The third is puzzle is a puzzle for value pluralist theories. They have two core commitments: one is that values are irreducible to one another, the other that the worth of some values is not trivial if compared to the worth of other values. However, I show that these two commitments are incompatible. After careful exploration, the thesis suggests solutions to these puzzles, namely: embracing transitivity, embracing a version of prioritarianism featuring an asymptote, and rejecting the first pluralist commitment. The Structured Range View is compatible with all these solutions.