Believing, imagining, and their relationship : a new theory of belief via the imagination

Abstract

This thesis defends that to better grasp the nature of human belief and why imagining can lead to belief change (for example through propaganda), we must revise the 'Standard View' of belief, of imagining, and of the relationship between them (abbreviated throughout as SV), which is implicit or explicit in much related theorising. The six most important axes upon which belief and propositional imagining are frequently contradistinguished are examined systematically. These axes radically oppose belief and imagining with respect to their etiological, distributive, epistemic, normative, motivational and affective profiles through explicit or implicit contrast theses. I dispute each of these contrast theses in turn and review criticisms of the Standard View offered by prior theorists. Although I do not accept the alternatives others have offered, I defend the challenges they raised from various objections and advance a new argument in favour of acknowledging that some propositional imaginings have (constitutive) norms close to those standardly thought characteristic of belief. I argue that the challenges raised, when considered jointly, support a radical revision of the orthodox view of belief, imagining, and of the relationship between believing that p and imagining that p. I propose that the best explanation of the challenges raised towards the Standard View makes plausible that belief is a complex state constituted in part by a basic, primary, imaginative state. I call this view, the Composition View. According to the Composition View, believing that p entails imagining that p (this is 'the Entailment View'); it entails imagining in a way that is regulated for truth and coherence. I also offer intermediate views for those unconvinced that we should make such radical revisions. I warn, however, that moderate anti-SV views too often fail because they do not go far enough in reconceptualising the relation between belief that p and imagining that p.