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Hyperintensionality and overfitting
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dc.contributor.author | Berto, Franz | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-04-10T15:30:09Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-04-10T15:30:09Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2024-04-08 | |
dc.identifier | 301035322 | |
dc.identifier | 767eb0e9-31ea-4b75-b78c-71cea82b5868 | |
dc.identifier | 85189797276 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Berto , F 2024 , ' Hyperintensionality and overfitting ' , Synthese , vol. 203 , 117 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04556-5 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0039-7857 | |
dc.identifier.other | ORCID: /0000-0003-3246-657X/work/157578802 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29639 | |
dc.description | Funding: This research is published within the project ‘The Logic of Conceivability’, funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), Grant No. 681404. | en |
dc.description.abstract | A hyperintensional epistemic logic would take the contents which can be known or believed as more fine-grained than sets of possible worlds. I consider one objection to the idea: Williamson’s Objection from Overfitting. I propose a hyperintensional account of propositions as sets of worlds enriched with topics: what those propositions, and so the attitudes having them as contents, are about. I show that the account captures the conditions under which sentences express the same content; that it can be pervasively applied in formal and mainstream epistemology; and that it is left unscathed by the objection. | |
dc.format.extent | 422122 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Synthese | en |
dc.subject | Aboutness | en |
dc.subject | Subject matters | en |
dc.subject | Topics | en |
dc.subject | Possible worlds semantics | en |
dc.subject | Hyperintensional semantics | en |
dc.subject | T-NDAS | en |
dc.title | Hyperintensionality and overfitting | en |
dc.type | Journal article | en |
dc.contributor.sponsor | European Research Council | en |
dc.contributor.institution | University of St Andrews. Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology | en |
dc.contributor.institution | University of St Andrews. Philosophy | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s11229-024-04556-5 | |
dc.description.status | Peer reviewed | en |
dc.identifier.grantnumber | 681404 | en |
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