Hyperintensionality and overfitting
Abstract
A hyperintensional epistemic logic would take the contents which can be known or believed as more fine-grained than sets of possible worlds. I consider one objection to the idea: Williamson’s Objection from Overfitting. I propose a hyperintensional account of propositions as sets of worlds enriched with topics: what those propositions, and so the attitudes having them as contents, are about. I show that the account captures the conditions under which sentences express the same content; that it can be pervasively applied in formal and mainstream epistemology; and that it is left unscathed by the objection.
Citation
Berto , F 2024 , ' Hyperintensionality and overfitting ' , Synthese , vol. 203 , 117 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04556-5
Publication
Synthese
Status
Peer reviewed
ISSN
0039-7857Type
Journal article
Description
Funding: This research is published within the project ‘The Logic of Conceivability’, funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), Grant No. 681404.Collections
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