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dc.contributor.authorBrown, Jessica A.
dc.identifier.citationBrown , J A 2023 , ' Group belief and direction of fit ' , Philosophical Studies , vol. 180 , pp. 3161-3178 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 290278148
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: aa2eab20-e6ca-409f-bfc1-f57e77dad188
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0002-1149-4814/work/142499303
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85170536881
dc.descriptionFunding: Thanks to the Leverhulme Trust for a Major Research Fellowship which helped fund this research (MRF 2020-035).en
dc.description.abstractWe standardly attribute beliefs to both individuals and organised groups, such as governments, corporations and universities. Just as we might say that an individual believes something, for instance that oil prices are rising, so we might say that a government or corporation does. If groups are to genuinely have beliefs, then they need states with the characteristic features of beliefs. One feature standardly taken to characterise beliefs is their mind to world direction of fit: they should fit the way the world is. By contrast, desires are standardly taken to have a world to mind direction of fit: they aim for the world to be a certain way and are satisfied when the world fits them. Recently, Lackey (2021) has appealed to direction of fit to argue against certain nonsummative accounts of group belief. Here, I argue that on deeper inspection, belief’s mind to world direction of fit is difficult to accommodate on summative accounts of group belief including Lackey’s own neo-summative account. Further, I argue that direction of fit considerations in fact motivate the main non-summative approaches to belief, namely functionalism and interpretationism. Along the way, we see how addressing the issue of the direction of fit of group beliefs raises important questions about how to understand group evidence and its relationship to the evidence of members.
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophical Studiesen
dc.rightsCopyright © The Author(s) 2023. Open Access. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit
dc.subjectGroup epistemologyen
dc.subjectGroup evidenceen
dc.subjectGroup beliefen
dc.subjectGroup justified beliefen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.titleGroup belief and direction of fiten
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.sponsorThe Leverhulme Trusten
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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