Attitude and action : against de se exceptionalism
Abstract
De se exceptionalism is the view that de se attitudes pose a distinctive problem for traditional theories of propositional attitudes. A recent argument for de se exceptionalism attempts to prove that the distinctive problem of de se attitudes has something to do with the role of de se attitudes in explaining actions. The argument is based on a case where two subjects seem to believe and desire all the same propositions but perform different actions. This is the most promising argument for de se exceptionalism in the current literature. This paper rejects the argument by proposing a novel model of action explanation, according to which agents perform what they consider to be the best actions. I will argue that the case, based on which the recent argument for de se exceptionalism is developed, is philosophically interesting. Traditional theories of propositional attitudes can accommodate the case easily. I will conclude that de se exceptionalism should be rejected.
Citation
Lin , L 2022 , ' Attitude and action : against de se exceptionalism ' , Inquiry - An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy , vol. Latest Articles . https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2022.2158126
Publication
Inquiry - An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
Status
Peer reviewed
ISSN
0020-174XType
Journal article
Description
Funding: This work was supported by China Scholarship Council – University of St Andrews Scholarships [201806360003].Collections
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