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dc.contributor.authorFouche, Camille
dc.date.accessioned2022-09-01T14:30:10Z
dc.date.available2022-09-01T14:30:10Z
dc.date.issued2022-08-31
dc.identifier.citationFouche , C 2022 , ' Hybrid modal realism debugged ' , Erkenntnis , vol. First Online . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00592-0en
dc.identifier.issn0165-0106
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 280534713
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 34e5f7d1-d8c8-4064-aa58-ff4cb82ff7af
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85137202808
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000848010700003
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/25933
dc.descriptionThis paper is part of a PhD project conducted thanks to a scholarship of the ‘School of Philosophical, Anthropological and Film Studies’ at the University of St Andrews and a doctoral contract at Sorbonne Université.en
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, I support a hybrid view regarding the metaphysics of worlds. I endorse Lewisian Modal Realism for possible worlds (LMR). My aim is to come up with a hybrid account of impossible worlds that provides all the plenitude of impossibilities for all fine-grained intentional contents. I raise several challenges for such a plenitudinous hybrid theory. My version of hybrid modal realism builds impossible worlds as set-theoretic constructions out of genuine individuals and sets of them, that is, as set-theoretic constructions from parts and sets of parts of genuine Lewisian worlds. Structured worlds are defined as sets of tuples: structured entities built out of Lewisian ‘raw material’. These structured worlds are ersatz worlds, some of which are impossible. I claim that propositions must be sets of worlds rather than members of sets. Once the construction is in place, I evaluate the proposal and show that my hybrid account is able to supply a plenitude of impossibilities and thus giving the resources to make all the hyperintensional distinctions we are looking for, whilst remaining Lewisian-conservative.
dc.format.extent25
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofErkenntnisen
dc.rightsCopyright © The Author(s) 2022. Open Access. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.en
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subjectNISen
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleHybrid modal realism debuggeden
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00592-0
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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