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dc.contributor.authorXavier Douglas, Alexander
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-27T23:42:11Z
dc.date.available2022-05-27T23:42:11Z
dc.date.issued2020-07
dc.identifier268257465
dc.identifierb81d52b1-87ec-4cfd-8047-f088dddd07c0
dc.identifier85101043209
dc.identifier.citationXavier Douglas , A 2020 , ' VII - Spinoza’s unquiet acquiescentia ' , Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , vol. 120 , no. 2 , pp. 145-163 . https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoaa008en
dc.identifier.issn0066-7374
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0001-9486-8991/work/75248685
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/25457
dc.description.abstractFor Spinoza, the highest thing we can hope for is acquiescentia in se ipso—acquiescence in oneself. As an ethical ideal, this might appear as a complacent quietism, a licence to accept the way you are and give up hope of improving either yourself or the world. I argue that the opposite is the case. Self-acquiescence in Spinoza’s sense is a very challenging goal: it requires a form of self-understanding that is extremely difficult to attain. It also involves occupying a daring and radical political position, one that obstructs the psychological mechanisms by which political power is typically maintained.
dc.format.extent320285
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofProceedings of the Aristotelian Societyen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleVII - Spinoza’s unquiet acquiescentiaen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoaa008
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2022-05-28


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