VII - Spinoza’s unquiet acquiescentia
MetadataShow full item record
For Spinoza, the highest thing we can hope for is acquiescentia in se ipso—acquiescence in oneself. As an ethical ideal, this might appear as a complacent quietism, a licence to accept the way you are and give up hope of improving either yourself or the world. I argue that the opposite is the case. Self-acquiescence in Spinoza’s sense is a very challenging goal: it requires a form of self-understanding that is extremely difficult to attain. It also involves occupying a daring and radical political position, one that obstructs the psychological mechanisms by which political power is typically maintained.
Xavier Douglas , A 2020 , ' VII - Spinoza’s unquiet acquiescentia ' , Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , vol. 120 , no. 2 , pp. 145-163 . https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoaa008
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society