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dc.contributor.authorMatthíasson, Ásgeir Berg
dc.date.accessioned2022-03-31T23:56:10Z
dc.date.available2022-03-31T23:56:10Z
dc.date.issued2020-10-01
dc.identifier.citationMatthíasson , Á B 2020 , ' Contradictions and falling bridges : what was Wittgenstein’s reply to Turing? ' , British Journal for the History of Philosophy , vol. Latest Articles . https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2020.1815646en
dc.identifier.issn0960-8788
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 269784790
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 95dc65b4-d185-4046-9abf-ff14d401bcba
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85091823505
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000574190900001
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/25131
dc.descriptionFunding: Work on this article has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation programme under Grant Agreement no. 675415.en
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, I offer a close reading of Wittgenstein's remarks on inconsistency, mostly as they appear in the Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics. I focus especially on an objection to Wittgenstein's view given by Alan Turing, who attended the lectures, the so called ‘falling bridges’-objection. Wittgenstein's position is that if contradictions arise in some practice of language, they are not necessarily fatal to that practice nor necessitate a revision of that practice. If we then assume that we have adopted a paraconsistent logic, Wittgenstein's answer to Turing is that if we run into trouble building our bridge, it is either because we have made a calculation mistake or our calculus does not actually describe the phenomenon it is intended to model. The possibility of either kind of error is not particular to contradictions nor to inconsistency, and thus contradictions do not have any special status as a thing to be avoided.
dc.format.extent23
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofBritish Journal for the History of Philosophyen
dc.rightsCopyright © 2020 BSHP. This work has been made available online in accordance with publisher policies or with permission. Permission for further reuse of this content should be sought from the publisher or the rights holder. This is the author created accepted manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2020.1815646en
dc.subjectParadoxesen
dc.subjectLudwig Wittgensteinen
dc.subjectAlan Turingen
dc.subjectLectures on the foundations of mathematicsen
dc.subjectInconsistencyen
dc.subjectBC Logicen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccBCen
dc.titleContradictions and falling bridges : what was Wittgenstein’s reply to Turing?en
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. University of St Andrewsen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2020.1815646
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2022-04-01


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