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dc.contributor.authorRussell, Gillian
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-29T11:30:06Z
dc.date.available2021-11-29T11:30:06Z
dc.date.issued2021-11-24
dc.identifier276831076
dc.identifiere5bf404e-da15-4b49-ad40-f5bdab1018a9
dc.identifier85119861880
dc.identifier000721639500001
dc.identifier.citationRussell , G 2021 , ' How to prove Hume’s Law ' , Journal of Philosophical Logic , vol. First Online . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-021-09643-3en
dc.identifier.issn1573-0433
dc.identifier.otherRIS: urn:95BFDB4499CF33817ABC8D15E52D9FBE
dc.identifier.otherRIS: Russell2021
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0001-6423-0655/work/164894557
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/24418
dc.description.abstractThis paper proves a precisification of Hume’s Law—the thesis that one cannot get an ought from an is—as an instance of a more general theorem which establishes several other philosophically interesting, though less controversial, barriers to logical consequence.
dc.format.extent30
dc.format.extent841328
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Philosophical Logicen
dc.subjectHume’s Lawen
dc.subjectBarriers to entailmenten
dc.subjectPhilosophical logicen
dc.subjectInvalidityen
dc.subjectLogical consequenceen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleHow to prove Hume’s Lawen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemologyen
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10992-021-09643-3
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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