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How to prove Hume’s Law
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dc.contributor.author | Russell, Gillian | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-29T11:30:06Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-29T11:30:06Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2021-11-24 | |
dc.identifier | 276831076 | |
dc.identifier | e5bf404e-da15-4b49-ad40-f5bdab1018a9 | |
dc.identifier | 85119861880 | |
dc.identifier | 000721639500001 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Russell , G 2021 , ' How to prove Hume’s Law ' , Journal of Philosophical Logic , vol. First Online . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-021-09643-3 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 1573-0433 | |
dc.identifier.other | RIS: urn:95BFDB4499CF33817ABC8D15E52D9FBE | |
dc.identifier.other | RIS: Russell2021 | |
dc.identifier.other | ORCID: /0000-0001-6423-0655/work/164894557 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10023/24418 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper proves a precisification of Hume’s Law—the thesis that one cannot get an ought from an is—as an instance of a more general theorem which establishes several other philosophically interesting, though less controversial, barriers to logical consequence. | |
dc.format.extent | 30 | |
dc.format.extent | 841328 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Philosophical Logic | en |
dc.subject | Hume’s Law | en |
dc.subject | Barriers to entailment | en |
dc.subject | Philosophical logic | en |
dc.subject | Invalidity | en |
dc.subject | Logical consequence | en |
dc.subject | B Philosophy (General) | en |
dc.subject | T-NDAS | en |
dc.subject.lcc | B1 | en |
dc.title | How to prove Hume’s Law | en |
dc.type | Journal article | en |
dc.contributor.institution | University of St Andrews. Philosophy | en |
dc.contributor.institution | University of St Andrews. Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s10992-021-09643-3 | |
dc.description.status | Peer reviewed | en |
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