How to prove Hume’s Law
Date
24/11/2021Keywords
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Abstract
This paper proves a precisification of Hume’s Law—the thesis that one cannot get an ought from an is—as an instance of a more general theorem which establishes several other philosophically interesting, though less controversial, barriers to logical consequence.
Citation
Russell , G 2021 , ' How to prove Hume’s Law ' , Journal of Philosophical Logic , vol. First Online . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-021-09643-3
Publication
Journal of Philosophical Logic
Status
Peer reviewed
ISSN
1573-0433Type
Journal article
Rights
Copyright © The Author(s) 2021. Open Access. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
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