Show simple item record

Files in this item


Item metadata

dc.contributor.authorRossi, Alessandro
dc.identifier.citationRossi , A 2021 , ' Kant and Russell on Leibniz’ existential assertions ' , Sophia , vol. First Online .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 272684037
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 625155df-58b2-489c-a308-4980b18df347
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000641244000002
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85111952759
dc.description.abstractLeibniz believed in a God that has the power to create beings and whose existence could be a priori demonstrated. Kant (KrV, A 592-602/B 620-630) objected that similar demonstrations all presuppose the false claim that existence is a real property. Russell (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) added that if existence were a real property Leibniz should have concluded that God does not actually have the power to create anything at all. First, I show that Leibniz’ conception of existence is incompatible with the one that Russell presupposes. Subsequently, I argue that on Leibniz’ conception of existence Russell’s objection is immediately undermined.
dc.rightsCopyright © The Author(s) 2021. Open Access. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit
dc.subjectOnotological arguementen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.titleKant and Russell on Leibniz’ existential assertionsen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.Philosophyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemologyen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record