Kant and Russell on Leibniz’ existential assertions
Abstract
Leibniz believed in a God that has the power to create beings and whose existence could be a priori demonstrated. Kant (KrV, A 592-602/B 620-630) objected that similar demonstrations all presuppose the false claim that existence is a real property. Russell (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) added that if existence were a real property Leibniz should have concluded that God does not actually have the power to create anything at all. First, I show that Leibniz’ conception of existence is incompatible with the one that Russell presupposes. Subsequently, I argue that on Leibniz’ conception of existence Russell’s objection is immediately undermined.
Citation
Rossi , A 2021 , ' Kant and Russell on Leibniz’ existential assertions ' , Sophia , vol. First Online . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-021-00831-x
Publication
Sophia
Status
Peer reviewed
ISSN
0038-1527Type
Journal article
Collections
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