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dc.contributor.authorEgler, Miguel
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-07T00:38:24Z
dc.date.available2021-02-07T00:38:24Z
dc.date.issued2020-02
dc.identifier.citationEgler , M 2020 , ' Testing for the phenomenal : intuition, metacognition, and philosophical methodology ' , Mind & Language , vol. 35 , no. 1 , pp. 48-66 . https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12229en
dc.identifier.issn0268-1064
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 257420055
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: f0cfebfd-a2c9-4e04-8fda-31b8c2c8b141
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85061295574
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000534210300001
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/21384
dc.description.abstractRecent empirical studies raise significant methodological concerns about the use of intuitions in philosophy. According to one prominent line of reply, these concerns are unwarranted since the empirical studies motivating them do not control for the putatively characteristic phenomenology of intuitions. This paper makes use of research on metacognitive states that share the phenomenology of intuitions to argue that this reply fails. Furthermore, it shows how empirical findings about these metacognitive states can help philosophers make better informed assessments of their warrant for relying on intuitions in inquiry.
dc.format.extent19
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofMind & Languageen
dc.rights© 2019, John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher's policies. This is the author created accepted version manuscript following peer review and as such may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/doi.org/10.1111/mila.12229en
dc.subjectExperimental philosophyen
dc.subjectFeeling of rightnessen
dc.subjectIntuitionen
dc.subjectMetacognitionen
dc.subjectPhenomenalismen
dc.subjectPhilosophical methodologyen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subjectRC0321 Neuroscience. Biological psychiatry. Neuropsychiatryen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.subject.lccRC0321en
dc.titleTesting for the phenomenal : intuition, metacognition, and philosophical methodologyen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12229
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2021-02-07


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