Testing for the phenomenal : intuition, metacognition, and philosophical methodology
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Recent empirical studies raise significant methodological concerns about the use of intuitions in philosophy. According to one prominent line of reply, these concerns are unwarranted since the empirical studies motivating them do not control for the putatively characteristic phenomenology of intuitions. This paper makes use of research on metacognitive states that share the phenomenology of intuitions to argue that this reply fails. Furthermore, it shows how empirical findings about these metacognitive states can help philosophers make better informed assessments of their warrant for relying on intuitions in inquiry.
Egler , M 2020 , ' Testing for the phenomenal : intuition, metacognition, and philosophical methodology ' , Mind & Language , vol. 35 , no. 1 , pp. 48-66 . https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12229
Mind & Language
© 2019, John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher's policies. This is the author created accepted version manuscript following peer review and as such may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/doi.org/10.1111/mila.12229
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