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dc.contributor.authorHawley, Katherine
dc.contributor.editorMichaelson, Eliot
dc.contributor.editorStokke, Andreas
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-01T00:39:21Z
dc.date.available2020-11-01T00:39:21Z
dc.date.issued2018-11-01
dc.identifier.citationHawley , K 2018 , Coercion and lies . in E Michaelson & A Stokke (eds) , Lying : language, knowledge, ethics, and politics . Engagingphilosophy , Oxford University Press , Oxford . https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198743965.003.0012en
dc.identifier.isbn9780198743965
dc.identifier.isbn9780191866791
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 241226001
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: dc20302a-c541-4ad5-b51e-adb4d4cab17d
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0002-8179-2550/work/50460067
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/20868
dc.description.abstractCan we be coerced into lying? Or does the very fact of coercion undercut the possibility of making an assertion? Through discussion of capitulations and other forms of coerced speech, this chapter explores the ways in which apparent assertions may be drained of standard normative significance, and thus excluded from the category of lies. Coerced pseudo-assertions are in this way similar to coerced pseudo-promises, and to coerced pseudo-gifts, neither of which have the standard normative significance associated with genuine promises and gifts. Nevertheless, our speech and actions under coercion are liable to moral evaluation, and coercion does not always make it permissible to speak falsely or attempt to mislead an audience.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherOxford University Press
dc.relation.ispartofLyingen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEngagingphilosophyen
dc.rightsCopyright © 2018 the Author. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created accepted version manuscript following peer review and as such may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198743965.003.0012en
dc.subjectCoercionen
dc.subjectDuressen
dc.subjectLiesen
dc.subjectAssertionen
dc.subjectPromisesen
dc.subjectGiftsen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subjectBDCen
dc.subjectR2Cen
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleCoercion and liesen
dc.typeBook itemen
dc.contributor.sponsorThe Leverhulme Trusten
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198743965.003.0012
dc.date.embargoedUntil2020-11-01
dc.identifier.urlhttps://global.oup.com/academic/product/lying-9780198743965en
dc.identifier.grantnumberen


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