Coercion and lies
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Can we be coerced into lying? Or does the very fact of coercion undercut the possibility of making an assertion? Through discussion of capitulations and other forms of coerced speech, this chapter explores the ways in which apparent assertions may be drained of standard normative significance, and thus excluded from the category of lies. Coerced pseudo-assertions are in this way similar to coerced pseudo-promises, and to coerced pseudo-gifts, neither of which have the standard normative significance associated with genuine promises and gifts. Nevertheless, our speech and actions under coercion are liable to moral evaluation, and coercion does not always make it permissible to speak falsely or attempt to mislead an audience.
Hawley , K 2018 , Coercion and lies . in E Michaelson & A Stokke (eds) , Lying : language, knowledge, ethics, and politics . Engagingphilosophy , Oxford University Press , Oxford . https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198743965.003.0012
Copyright © 2018 the Author. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created accepted version manuscript following peer review and as such may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198743965.003.0012
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