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dc.contributor.authorDickie, Imogen
dc.identifier.citationDickie , I 2014 , ' The sortal dependence of demonstrative reference ' , European Journal of Philosophy , vol. 22 , no. 1 , pp. 34-60 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 261206224
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 5c18da1c-842a-4944-b14c-7173249081f2
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0001-9346-643X/work/69029583
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84897021247
dc.description.abstractArgues that the capacity to classify an object according to its kind is not implicated in picking the thing out as an object of demonstrative thought, but is implicated in thinking a whole 'That is F' thought about it, and makes the case for the superiority of this view to more standard 'sortalist' theses. ‘Sortalism about demonstrative reference’ is the view that the capacity to refer to things demonstratively rests on the capacity to classify them according to their kinds. This paper argues for one form of sortalism. Section 1 distinguishes two sortalist views. Section 2 argues that one of them is false. Section 3 argues that the other is true. Section 4 uses the argument from Section 3 to develop a new response to the objection to sortalism from examples where we seem to succeed in referring even though we get sortal classification wrong, or do not attempt to classify at all.
dc.relation.ispartofEuropean Journal of Philosophyen
dc.rights© 2011 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This work has been made available online in accordance with publisher policies or with permission. Permission for further reuse of this content should be sought from the publisher or the rights holder. This is the author created accepted manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at
dc.subjectDemonstrative referenceen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.titleThe sortal dependence of demonstrative referenceen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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