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The sortal dependence of demonstrative reference

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Date
03/2014
Author
Dickie, Imogen
Keywords
Demonstratives
Demonstrative reference
Sortalism
Sortal
B Philosophy (General)
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Abstract
Argues that the capacity to classify an object according to its kind is not implicated in picking the thing out as an object of demonstrative thought, but is implicated in thinking a whole 'That is F' thought about it, and makes the case for the superiority of this view to more standard 'sortalist' theses. ‘Sortalism about demonstrative reference’ is the view that the capacity to refer to things demonstratively rests on the capacity to classify them according to their kinds. This paper argues for one form of sortalism. Section 1 distinguishes two sortalist views. Section 2 argues that one of them is false. Section 3 argues that the other is true. Section 4 uses the argument from Section 3 to develop a new response to the objection to sortalism from examples where we seem to succeed in referring even though we get sortal classification wrong, or do not attempt to classify at all.
Citation
Dickie , I 2014 , ' The sortal dependence of demonstrative reference ' , European Journal of Philosophy , vol. 22 , no. 1 , pp. 34-60 . https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00470.x
Publication
European Journal of Philosophy
Status
Peer reviewed
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00470.x
ISSN
0966-8373
Type
Journal article
Rights
© 2011 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This work has been made available online in accordance with publisher policies or with permission. Permission for further reuse of this content should be sought from the publisher or the rights holder. This is the author created accepted manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00470.x
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  • University of St Andrews Research
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/19466

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