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dc.contributor.authorMorelli, Massimo
dc.contributor.authorNegri, Margherita
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-04T00:35:57Z
dc.date.available2020-01-04T00:35:57Z
dc.date.issued2019-02-01
dc.identifier250890850
dc.identifierfd78a805-b027-44cb-b2fa-ac5685a0c2be
dc.identifier85059549980
dc.identifier000457787200012
dc.identifier.citationMorelli , M & Negri , M 2019 , ' Redistributing income under proportional representation : a correction ' , Journal of Political Economy , vol. 127 , no. 1 , pp. 458-462 . https://doi.org/10.1086/700733en
dc.identifier.issn0022-3808
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/19219
dc.description.abstractAusten-Smith (2000) reports a theoretical result that if the cost of entering the workforce is sufficiently low, winner-take-all political systems induce endogenous redistribution levels that are systematically lower than those determined by proportional representation systems (Proposition 6). The proof in Austen-Smith (2000) has a mistake. We explain the mistake and offer an alternative proof. The conclusion of the original paper continues to hold.
dc.format.extent5
dc.format.extent193117
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Political Economyen
dc.subjectHB Economic Theoryen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subjectBDCen
dc.subject.lccHBen
dc.titleRedistributing income under proportional representation : a correctionen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Economics and Financeen
dc.identifier.doi10.1086/700733
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2020-01-04


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