Redistributing income under proportional representation : a correction
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Date
01/02/2019Metadata
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Abstract
Austen-Smith (2000) reports a theoretical result that if the cost of entering the workforce is sufficiently low, winner-take-all political systems induce endogenous redistribution levels that are systematically lower than those determined by proportional representation systems (Proposition 6). The proof in Austen-Smith (2000) has a mistake. We explain the mistake and offer an alternative proof. The conclusion of the original paper continues to hold.
Citation
Morelli , M & Negri , M 2019 , ' Redistributing income under proportional representation : a correction ' , Journal of Political Economy , vol. 127 , no. 1 , pp. 458-462 . https://doi.org/10.1086/700733
Publication
Journal of Political Economy
Status
Peer reviewed
ISSN
0022-3808Type
Journal article
Rights
Copyright © 2019, The University of Chicago. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/10.1086/700733
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