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dc.contributor.authorDuncan Kerr, Alison
dc.identifier.citationDuncan Kerr , A 2019 , ' A plea for KR ' , Synthese , vol. In press , pp. 1-25 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 259130040
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 37af5bdb-247a-4acc-9b6c-ac81f8d639ff
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85066804373
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0001-8051-1115/work/69029527
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000641858800010
dc.description.abstractThere is a strong case to be made for thinking that an obscure logic, KR, is better than classical logic and better than any relevant logic. The argument for KR over relevant logics is that KR counts disjunctive syllogism valid, and this is the biggest complaint about relevant logics. The argument for KR over classical logic depends on the normativity of logic and the paradoxes of implication. The paradoxes of implication are taken by relevant logicians to justify relevant logic, but considerations on the normativity of logic show that only some of the paradoxes of implication are genuine. KR avoids all the genuine paradoxes of implication, unlike classical logic. Overall, KR avoids the genuine paradoxes of implication and avoids the major objection to relevant logics. This combination of features provides strong reason to give KR a place in the conversation about the right logic(s).
dc.rights© The Author(s) 2019. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.en
dc.subjectRelevant logicen
dc.subjectParadoxes of implicationen
dc.subjectBC Logicen
dc.titleA plea for KRen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.Philosophyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemologyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.Institute for Gender Studiesen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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