Scepticism about moral superiority
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Chapman & Huffman suggest that we might change people’s behavior toward animals by resisting an argument that because humans are intellectually superior to animals they are also morally superior to animals. C & H try to show that the premise is false: Humans are not intellectually superior. Several commentators have resisted this response. We suggest that there are other ways of attacking the argument: The notion of moral superiority on which the argument relies is dubious, and the obvious ways of reformulating the argument are instances of the “naturalistic fallacy.”
Ball , D N & Sachs , B A 2019 , ' Scepticism about moral superiority ' , Animal Sentience , vol. 3 , no. 23 .
Non peer reviewed
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