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dc.contributor.authorPalazzo, Francesco
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Min
dc.identifier.citationPalazzo , F & Zhang , M 2017 , ' Information disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and busts ' , Economics Letters , vol. 158 , pp. 37-40 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 250334529
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 730228e0-3357-481a-b045-90ab86062315
dc.identifier.otherRIS: urn:3CB0E899F8BB43EEDF5A8983DD2295DE
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85030467107
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0002-0704-2516/work/60427668
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000408300300011
dc.description.abstractWe consider a model in which agents gradually learn about the aggregate market conditions — ‘boom’ or ‘bust’ — from the information disclosed after a trading round. The disclosure rules can generate asymmetric learning and affect the degree of asymmetry. In particular, when only winning bids are publicly disclosed, learning is more rapid in a bust.
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics Lettersen
dc.rights© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at
dc.subjectAsymmetric learningen
dc.subjectInformation disclosureen
dc.subjectHB Economic Theoryen
dc.titleInformation disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and bustsen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.School of Economics and Financeen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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