Information disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and busts
Date
09/2017Metadata
Show full item recordAbstract
We consider a model in which agents gradually learn about the aggregate market conditions — ‘boom’ or ‘bust’ — from the information disclosed after a trading round. The disclosure rules can generate asymmetric learning and affect the degree of asymmetry. In particular, when only winning bids are publicly disclosed, learning is more rapid in a bust.
Citation
Palazzo , F & Zhang , M 2017 , ' Information disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and busts ' , Economics Letters , vol. 158 , pp. 37-40 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.06.027
Publication
Economics Letters
Status
Peer reviewed
ISSN
0165-1765Type
Journal article
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