Information disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and busts
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We consider a model in which agents gradually learn about the aggregate market conditions — ‘boom’ or ‘bust’ — from the information disclosed after a trading round. The disclosure rules can generate asymmetric learning and affect the degree of asymmetry. In particular, when only winning bids are publicly disclosed, learning is more rapid in a bust.
Palazzo , F & Zhang , M 2017 , ' Information disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and busts ' , Economics Letters , vol. 158 , pp. 37-40 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.06.027
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.06.027
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