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dc.contributor.authorBackes, Marvin
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-20T11:30:06Z
dc.date.available2018-08-20T11:30:06Z
dc.date.issued2018-08-20
dc.identifier.citationBackes , M 2018 , ' Normalcy, justification, and the easy-defeat problem ' Philosophical Studies , vol. First Online . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1155-yen
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 255418458
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 61f5bf02-5bd7-4c28-a359-58cba048b660
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85051764623
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/15846
dc.description.abstractRecent years have seen the rise of a new family of non-probabilistic accounts of epistemic justification. According to these views—we may call them Normalcy Views—a belief in P is justified only if, given the evidence, there exists no normal world in which S falsely beliefs that P. This paper aims to raise some trouble for this new approach to justification by arguing that Normalcy Views, while initially attractive, give rise to problematic accounts of epistemic defeat. As we will see, on Normalcy Views seemingly insignificant pieces of evidence turn out to have considerable defeating powers. This problem—I will call it the Easy-Defeat Problem—gives rise to a two-pronged challenge. First, it shows that the Normalcy View has counterintuitive implications and, second, it opens the door to an uncomfortable skeptical threat.en
dc.format.extent19en
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophical Studiesen
dc.rights© The Author(s) 2018. Open Access. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.en
dc.subjectJustificationen
dc.subjectDefeaten
dc.subjectNormalcyen
dc.subjectMulti premise closureen
dc.subjectLotteriesen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleNormalcy, justification, and the easy-defeat problemen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1155-y
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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