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dc.contributor.authorSlack, Sean
dc.contributor.authorUlph, David
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-11T23:33:05Z
dc.date.available2018-08-11T23:33:05Z
dc.date.issued2017-04
dc.identifier.citationSlack , S & Ulph , D 2017 , ' Optimal universal and categorical benefit provision with classification errors and imperfect enforcement ' Journal of Public Economic Theory , vol. 19 , no. 2 , pp. 289-311 . https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12218en
dc.identifier.issn1097-3923
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 243585381
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 83b6d7bd-4782-452b-93dd-fd92bab569ac
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84992451595
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-3171-1270/work/59464506
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/15804
dc.descriptionFinancial support from the AXA Research Fund is gratefully acknowledged.en
dc.description.abstractWe determine the optimal combination of a universal benefit and categorical benefit when individuals differ in their ability to work and, if able to work, their productivity. The categorical benefit is conditioned ex ante on applicants being unable to work and ex post on recipients not working. The awards test makes Type I/II errors. If the ex post condition is (i) not enforced the optimal categorical benefit is positive only if the awards test has discriminatory power, whilst maximum welfare falls with both error propensities; but if (ii) fully enforced the optimal categorical benefit is positive always and maximum welfare can increase with the Type II error propensity.
dc.format.extent23
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Public Economic Theoryen
dc.rights© 2016, Wiley Periodicals, Inc. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at onlinelibrary.wiley.com / https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12218en
dc.subjectCategorical benefiten
dc.subjectClassification errorsen
dc.subjectUniversal benefiten
dc.subjectTaxationen
dc.subjectHB Economic Theoryen
dc.subjectHD28 Management. Industrial Managementen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccHBen
dc.subject.lccHD28en
dc.titleOptimal universal and categorical benefit provision with classification errors and imperfect enforcementen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.School of Economics and Financeen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12218
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2018-08-12


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