Quatenus and Spinoza's monism
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I examine Spinoza’s use of the term quatenus. It is, I argue, an operator working in the context of a broader logical theory and blocking certain inferences that, according to critics such as Pierre Bayle, lead Spinoza’s metaphysical system into absurdities. I reconstruct this crucial theory from some treatises on logic to which Spinoza had access. I then show how a later logical theory—that of the Port-Royal Logic—does not permit Bayle’s troublesome inferences to be blocked by the use of terms like quatenus. Most likely Bayle was thinking in terms of the later theory, Spinoza in terms of the earlier.
Douglas , A 2018 , ' Quatenus and Spinoza's monism ' , Journal of the History of Philosophy , vol. 56 , no. 2 , pp. 261-280 . https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2018.0023
Journal of the History of Philosophy
Copyright © 2018 Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc. his work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the final published version of the work, which was originally published at: https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2018.0023
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