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dc.contributor.authorTimmermann, Jens
dc.identifier.citationTimmermann , J 2018 , ' Autonomy, progress and virtue : why Kant has nothing to fear from the overdemandingness objection ' , Kantian Review , vol. 23 , no. 3 , pp. 379-397 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 252772269
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 2026215e-1541-4273-8c54-9da5179222c7
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85052056084
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000442355600003
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-4155-3288/work/69463315
dc.description.abstractIs Kant’s ethical theory too demanding? Do its commands ask too much of us, either by calling for self-sacrifice on particular occasions, or by pervading our lives to the extent that there is no room for permissible action? In this article, I argue that Kant’s ethics is very demanding, but not excessively so. The notion of ‘latitude’ (the idea that wide duty admits of ‘exceptions’) does not help. But we need to bear in mind (i) that moral laws are self-imposed and cannot be externally enforced; (ii) that ‘right action’ is not a category of Kantian ethics – there is a more and a less, and lack of perfection does not entail vice; and (iii) that only practice makes perfect, i.e. how much virtue can realistically be expected can vary from agent to agent. The principle that ‘ought’ is limited by ‘can’ is firmly entrenched in Kant’s ethical thought.
dc.relation.ispartofKantian Reviewen
dc.rights© 2018, Kantian Review. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at
dc.subjectMoral progressen
dc.subjectB Philosophy. Psychology. Religionen
dc.titleAutonomy, progress and virtue : why Kant has nothing to fear from the overdemandingness objectionen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Centre for Global Law and Governanceen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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