Show simple item record

Files in this item

Thumbnail

Item metadata

dc.contributor.authorTimmermann, Jens
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-10T11:30:08Z
dc.date.available2018-04-10T11:30:08Z
dc.date.issued2018-09
dc.identifier.citationTimmermann , J 2018 , ' Autonomy, progress and virtue : why Kant has nothing to fear from the overdemandingness objection ' , Kantian Review , vol. 23 , no. 3 , pp. 379-397 . https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415418000201en
dc.identifier.issn1369-4154
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 252772269
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 2026215e-1541-4273-8c54-9da5179222c7
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85052056084
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000442355600003
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-4155-3288/work/69463315
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/13105
dc.description.abstractIs Kant’s ethical theory too demanding? Do its commands ask too much of us, either by calling for self-sacrifice on particular occasions, or by pervading our lives to the extent that there is no room for permissible action? In this article, I argue that Kant’s ethics is very demanding, but not excessively so. The notion of ‘latitude’ (the idea that wide duty admits of ‘exceptions’) does not help. But we need to bear in mind (i) that moral laws are self-imposed and cannot be externally enforced; (ii) that ‘right action’ is not a category of Kantian ethics – there is a more and a less, and lack of perfection does not entail vice; and (iii) that only practice makes perfect, i.e. how much virtue can realistically be expected can vary from agent to agent. The principle that ‘ought’ is limited by ‘can’ is firmly entrenched in Kant’s ethical thought.
dc.format.extent19
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofKantian Reviewen
dc.rights© 2018, Kantian Review. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415418000201en
dc.subjectDemandingnessen
dc.subjectAutonomyen
dc.subjectLatitudeen
dc.subjectMoral progressen
dc.subjectB Philosophy. Psychology. Religionen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subjectBDCen
dc.subjectR2Cen
dc.subject.lccBen
dc.titleAutonomy, progress and virtue : why Kant has nothing to fear from the overdemandingness objectionen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Centre for Global Law and Governanceen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415418000201
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record