Autonomy, progress and virtue : why Kant has nothing to fear from the overdemandingness objection
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It does not bode well for an ethical theory if it inflicts unrealistic requirements on moral agents, if it strains human nature unduly, or if the price of complying with its prescriptions seems not worth paying. Classical utilitarianism is particularly vulnerable to such objections.1 It is, however, a legitimate question whether other ethical systems fare any better. In this paper, I address the issue whether Kant’s ethics can be impugned or rejected on the grounds that it is overly demanding.
Timmermann , J 2018 , ' Autonomy, progress and virtue : why Kant has nothing to fear from the overdemandingness objection ' Kantian Review .
© 2018, The Kantian Review. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/kantian-review
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