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dc.contributor.authorBackes, Marvin
dc.identifier.citationBackes , M 2017 , ' A bitter pill for closure ' , Synthese , vol. First Online .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 251494974
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: fb01e7bc-b3d6-4373-bc90-0f2ade22076b
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85034234557
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000490473800017
dc.description.abstractThe primary objective of this paper is to introduce a new epistemic paradox that puts pressure on the claim that justification is closed under multi premise deduction. The first part of the paper will consider two well-known paradoxes—the lottery and the preface paradox—and outline two popular strategies for solving the paradoxes without denying closure. The second part will introduce a new, structurally related, paradox that is immune to these closure-preserving solutions. I will call this paradox, The Paradox of the Pill. Seeing that the prominent closure-preserving solutions do not apply to the new paradox, I will argue that it presents a much stronger case against the claim that justification is closed under deduction than its two predecessors. Besides presenting a more robust counterexample to closure, the new paradox also reveals that the strategies that were previously thought to get closure out of trouble are not sufficiently general to achieve this task as they fail to apply to similar closure-threatening paradoxes in the same vicinity.
dc.rights© The Author(s) 2017. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.en
dc.subjectLottery paradoxen
dc.subjectPreface paradoxen
dc.subjectMulti premise closureen
dc.subjectParadox of the pillen
dc.subjectB Philosophy. Psychology. Religionen
dc.titleA bitter pill for closureen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.Philosophyen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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