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dc.contributor.authorKolotilin, Anton
dc.contributor.authorMylovanov, Tymofiy
dc.contributor.authorZapechelnyuk, Andriy
dc.contributor.authorLi, Ming
dc.date.accessioned2017-08-18T10:30:08Z
dc.date.available2017-08-18T10:30:08Z
dc.date.issued2017-12-04
dc.identifier.citationKolotilin , A , Mylovanov , T , Zapechelnyuk , A & Li , M 2017 , ' Persuasion of a privately informed receiver ' , Econometrica , vol. 85 , no. 6 , pp. 1949-1964 . https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA13251en
dc.identifier.issn0012-9682
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 250348868
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 608fc2e1-e398-4792-a70b-0da47e7dfa35
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000417101400010
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0001-5033-3848/work/63716978
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/11504
dc.descriptionKolotilin acknowledges financial support from the Australian Research Council. Zapechelnyuk acknowledges financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council (grant no. ES/N01829X/1)en
dc.description.abstractWe study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff-relevant state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiver's report about his type, whereas an experiment discloses information independent of the receiver's type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments, and characterize optimal persuasion mechanisms.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofEconometricaen
dc.rights© 2017, The Econometric Society. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi/org/10.3982/ECTA13251en
dc.subjectBayesian persuasionen
dc.subjectInformation disclosureen
dc.subjectInformation designen
dc.subjectMechanism design without transfersen
dc.subjectExperimentsen
dc.subjectPersuasion mechanismen
dc.subjectHB Economic Theoryen
dc.subjectQA Mathematicsen
dc.subjectNDASen
dc.subjectBDCen
dc.subjectR2Cen
dc.subject.lccHBen
dc.subject.lccQAen
dc.titlePersuasion of a privately informed receiveren
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.School of Economics and Financeen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA13251
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.identifier.urlhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3982/ECTA13251/fullen


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