Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
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We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff-relevant state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiver's report about his type, whereas an experiment discloses information independent of the receiver's type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments, and characterize optimal persuasion mechanisms.
Kolotilin , A , Mylovanov , T , Zapechelnyuk , A & Li , M 2017 , ' Persuasion of a privately informed receiver ' , Econometrica , vol. 85 , no. 6 , pp. 1949-1964 . https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA13251
© 2017, The Econometric Society. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi/org/10.3982/ECTA13251
DescriptionKolotilin acknowledges financial support from the Australian Research Council. Zapechelnyuk acknowledges financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council (grant no. ES/N01829X/1)
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