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dc.contributor.authorHiggins, Joe
dc.date.accessioned2017-07-04T14:30:09Z
dc.date.available2017-07-04T14:30:09Z
dc.date.issued2018-07
dc.identifier.citationHiggins , J 2018 , ' Biosocial selfhood : overcoming the ‘body-social problem’ within the individuation of the human self ' Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences , vol. 17 , no. 3 , pp. 433-454 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-017-9514-2en
dc.identifier.issn1568-7759
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 250088588
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: c0ebeb53-a72d-4405-bcdc-4107079afd5b
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85020683997
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/11144
dc.description.abstractIn a recent paper, Kyselo (2014) argues that an enactive approach to selfhood can overcome ‘the body-social problem’: “the question for philosophy of cognitive science about how bodily and social aspects figure in the individuation of the human individual self” (Kyselo, 2014, p. 4; see also Kyselo and Di Paolo (2013)). Kyselo’s claim is that we should conceive of the human self as a socially enacted phenomenon that is bodily mediated. Whilst there is much to be praised about this claim, I will demonstrate in this paper that such a conception of self ultimately leads to a strained interpretation of how bodily and social processes are related. To this end, I will begin the paper by elucidating the body-social problem as it appears in modern cognitive science and then expounding Kyselo’s solution, which relies on a novel interpretation of Jonas’s (1966/2001) concept of needful freedom. In response to this solution, I will highlight two problems which Kyselo’s account cannot overcome in its current state. I will argue that a more satisfactory solution to the body-social problem involves a re-conception of the human body as irrevocably socially constituted and the human social world as irrevocably bodily constituted. On this view, even the most minimal sense of selfhood cannot privilege either bodily or social processes; instead, the two are ontologically entwined such that humans are biosocial selves.en
dc.format.extent22en
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciencesen
dc.rights© The Author(s) 2017. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.en
dc.subjectSelfhooden
dc.subjectCognitive scienceen
dc.subjectEmbodimenten
dc.subjectEnsocialmenten
dc.subjectBody-social problemen
dc.subjectEnactivismen
dc.subjectB Philosophy. Psychology. Religionen
dc.subjectRC0321 Neuroscience. Biological psychiatry. Neuropsychiatryen
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subject.lccBen
dc.subject.lccRC0321en
dc.titleBiosocial selfhood : overcoming the ‘body-social problem’ within the individuation of the human selfen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. The University of St Andrewsen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-017-9514-2
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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