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dc.contributor.authorSnedegar, Justin
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-21T15:30:12Z
dc.date.available2017-03-21T15:30:12Z
dc.date.issued2018-03
dc.identifier249240031
dc.identifier3f3c3bdf-db37-4589-b3b7-422e92dc6cac
dc.identifier85014192940
dc.identifier000424908500008
dc.identifier.citationSnedegar , J 2018 , ' Reasons for and reasons against ' , Philosophical Studies , vol. 175 , no. 3 , pp. 725-743 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0889-2en
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0002-2552-0702/work/64697918
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/10502
dc.description.abstractWhat an agent ought to do is determined by competition between reasons bearing on the options open to her. The popular metaphor of balancing or weighing reasons on a scale to represent this competition encourages a focus on competition between reasons for competing options. But what an agent ought to do also depends on the reasons against those options. The balancing metaphor does not provide an obvious way to represent reasons against. Partly as a result of this, there is a serious lack of work on reasons against. A simple view is that there is no problem here, since reasons against an option are really just more reasons for—in particular, reasons for certain alternatives. This simple view lets us maintain the balancing metaphor, and more importantly, it simplifies theorizing about the competition between reasons. This is because if it’s true, there is really just one kind of competition, the competition between reasons for competing options. This paper challenges the simple view, arguing against several ways of identifying which alternatives to an option the reasons against it are reasons for. I also sketch a competing view, according to which reasons against are distinct from reasons for—these are two different normative relations. If this kind of view is correct, then our theory of the competition between reasons will need to recognize at least two kinds of competition: the one between reasons for competing options, and the one between the reasons for an option and the reasons against it.
dc.format.extent392341
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophical Studiesen
dc.subjectWeighten
dc.subjectOughten
dc.subjectPractical reasoningen
dc.subjectReasons againsten
dc.subjectReasonsen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subjectT-NDASen
dc.subjectBDCen
dc.subjectR2Cen
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleReasons for and reasons againsten
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11098-017-0889-2
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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