Minimal disturbance : in defence of pragmatic reasons of the right kind
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This paper draws attention to an important methodological shortcoming in debates about what counts as a reason for belief. An extremely influential distinction in this literature is between reasons of the ‘right kind’ and the ‘wrong kind’. However, as I will demonstrate, arguments making use of this distinction often rely on a specific (and not explicitly stated) conception of epistemic rationality. Shifting focus to a reasonable alternative, namely a coherentist conception, can lead to surprising consequences—in particular, pragmatic reasons can, against orthodoxy, indeed be reasons of the right kind for belief.
Bastian , L 2019 , ' Minimal disturbance : in defence of pragmatic reasons of the right kind ' , Philosophical Studies , vol. First Online . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01385-y
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DescriptionFunding: UK Arts and Humanities Research Council 1796583.
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