Reply to Eaton and Pickavance

dc.contributor.author	Weatherson, Brian James
dc.date.accessioned	2017-03-12T00:33:25Z
dc.date.available	2017-03-12T00:33:25Z
dc.date.issued	2016-03-11
dc.identifier	246879861
dc.identifier	92701f15-57ed-4594-91d2-51430611e270
dc.identifier	84960447570
dc.identifier	000389806500006
dc.identifier.citation	Weatherson , B J 2016 , ' Reply to Eaton and Pickavance ' , Philosophical Studies , pp. 1-3 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0660-0	en
dc.identifier.issn	0031-8116
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10023/10456
dc.description.abstract	David Eaton and Timothy Pickavance argued that interest-relative invariantism has a surprising and interesting consequence. They take this consequence to be so implausible that it refutes interest-relative invariantism. But in fact it is a consequence that any theory of knowledge that has the resources to explain familiar puzzles (such as Gettier cases) must have.
dc.format.extent	31404
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartof	Philosophical Studies	en
dc.subject	Knowledge	en
dc.subject	Interests	en
dc.subject	Gettier cases	en
dc.subject	B Philosophy (General)	en
dc.subject.lcc	B1	en
dc.title	Reply to Eaton and Pickavance	en
dc.type	Journal item	en
dc.contributor.institution	University of St Andrews. School of Philosophical, Anthropological and Film Studies	en
dc.contributor.institution	University of St Andrews. Philosophy	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/s11098-016-0660-0
dc.description.status	Peer reviewed	en
dc.date.embargoedUntil	2017-03-11