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Should we pay for ecosystem service outputs, inputs or both?

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Hanley_2016_E_RE_EcosystemServiceOutputs_AM.pdf (647.4Kb)
Date
01/04/2016
Author
White, Ben
Hanley, Nicholas David
Keywords
Adverse selection
Biodiversity
Moral hazard
Payments for ecosystem services
Principal-agent models
GE Environmental Sciences
Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
Aerospace Engineering
NDAS
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Abstract
Payments for ecosystem service outputs have recently become a popular policy prescription for a range of agri-environmental schemes. The focus of this paper is on the choice of contract instruments to incentivise the provision of ecosystem service outputs from farms. The farmer is better informed than the regulator in terms of hidden information about costs and hidden-actions relating to effort. The results show that with perfect information, the regulator can contract equivalently on inputs or outputs. With hidden information, input-based contracts are more cost effective at reducing the informational rent related to adverse selection than output-based contracts. Mixed contracts are also cost-effective, especially where one input is not observable. Such contracts allow the regulator to target variables that are “costly-to-fake” as opposed to those prone to moral hazard such as effort. Further results are given for fixed price contracts and input-based contracts with moral hazard. The model is extended to include a discussion of repeated contracting and the scope that exists for the regulator to benefit from information revealed by the initial choice of contract. The models are applied to a case study of contracting with farmers to protect high biodiversity native vegetation that also provides socially-valuable ecosystem services.
Citation
White , B & Hanley , N D 2016 , ' Should we pay for ecosystem service outputs, inputs or both? ' , Environmental and Resource Economics , vol. 63 , no. 4 , pp. 765-787 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-016-0002-x
Publication
Environmental and Resource Economics
Status
Peer reviewed
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-016-0002-x
ISSN
0924-6460
Type
Journal article
Rights
Copyright © 2016, Springer + Business Media Dordrecht. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10640-016-0002-x
Collections
  • University of St Andrews Research
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/10390

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