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dc.contributor.advisorBryant, Christopher
dc.contributor.authorDonald, Alexander Paul
dc.coverage.spatialvii, 300 p.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-01T15:28:27Z
dc.date.available2017-03-01T15:28:27Z
dc.date.issued1989
dc.identifieruk.bl.ethos.328083
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/10385
dc.description.abstractI identify and examine the grounds on which we describe an agent's non-doing as an omission to do X, and a cause of Y. I distinguish between the formal and material aspects of an omission. This is useful in setting aside obvious differences between actions and omissions, which some writers take to be significant, in particular the view that an omission can be identified with whatever action an agent performs or movement he makes when he omits to X. In fact, he need not make a bodily movement, perform some other action in order to prevent himself from doing X, or decide not to perform X. It is by no means certain that any omission is timeable, and most are certainly not. I note difficulties for any account of intention that is meant to embrace intentional omissions as well as actions. I do not offer a single, all-embracing account of omissions, because I think it is impossible to provide one. I acknowledge the importance of the role of expectation in identifying omissions, particularly as causes, but argue that there are sorts of omissions which are not identified by the presence of defeated expectation. I take the view that some omissions are in an important way indistinguishable from actions and may therefore be regarded as causes. Also that some non-doings which are not omissions may be regarded as causes. I criticise the ability of traditional analyses of causality to comprehend the possibility of omissive causation and expound alternative accounts of what constitutes a cause in order to do justice to that possibility. I find useful Collingwood's account of what it is to speak of causality in terms appropriate to a practical natural science; that is, in the language of means and ends.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of St Andrews
dc.subject.lccBC199.O7D7
dc.titleActa and omissionsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.sponsorUniversity of St Andrewsen_US
dc.contributor.sponsorCarnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotlanden_US
dc.contributor.sponsorHumanitarian Trusten_US
dc.contributor.sponsorWest Fife Edcational Trusten_US
dc.contributor.sponsorSir Richard Stapley Educational Trusten_US
dc.contributor.sponsorGilchrist Trusten_US
dc.contributor.sponsorNewby Trusten_US
dc.contributor.sponsorHeinz and Anna Kroch Foundationen_US
dc.type.qualificationlevelDoctoralen_US
dc.type.qualificationnamePhD Doctor of Philosophyen_US
dc.publisher.institutionThe University of St Andrewsen_US


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