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Strong, bold, and kind : Self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas

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Date
03/2017
Author
Kocher, Martin
Martinsson, Peter
Myrseth, Kristian Ove
Wollbrant, Conny
Keywords
Experiment
Public good
Self-control
Cooperation
Risk
HB Economic Theory
NDAS
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Abstract
We develop a model that relates self-control to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas, and we test the model in a laboratory public goods experiment. As predicted, we find a robust association between stronger self-control and higher levels of cooperation, and the association is at its strongest when the decision maker’s risk aversion is low and the cooperation levels of others high. We interpret the pattern as evidence for the notion that individuals may experience an impulse to act in self-interest—and that cooperative behavior benefits from self-control. Free-riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place.
Citation
Kocher , M , Martinsson , P , Myrseth , K O & Wollbrant , C 2017 , ' Strong, bold, and kind : Self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas ' , Experimental Economics , vol. 20 , no. 1 , pp. 44-69 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-015-9475-7
Publication
Experimental Economics
Status
Peer reviewed
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-015-9475-7
ISSN
1386-4157
Type
Journal article
Rights
© 2016, Springer US. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-015-9475-7
Description
Financial support from the Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsrådet), from Formas through the program Human Cooperation to Manage Natural Resources (COMMONS), and the Ideenfonds of the University of Munich is gratefully acknowledged.
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  • University of St Andrews Research
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/10192

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