Contextualism about evidential support
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In this paper, I examine a contextualist thesis that has been little discussed in comparison with contextualism about knowledge, namely contextualism about evidential support. This seems surprising since, prima facie, evidential support statements seem shifty in a way parallel to knowledge ascriptions. I examine but reject the suggestion that contrastivism about evidential support is motivated by arguments analogous to those used to motivate contrastivism about knowledge including sceptical closure arguments, the nature of inquiry, the existence of explicitly contrastive evidential support statements, and the intuitive shiftiness of some binary evidential support statements. I end by discussing the relations between contextualism about evidential support, evidence and knowledge. In particular, I argue that my discussion of contrastivism about evidential support undermines Neta’s contextualist view about evidence, and his broader suggestion that the shiftiness of evidence statements explains the shiftiness of knowledge ascriptions.
Brown , J A 2016 , ' Contextualism about evidential support ' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , vol. 92 , no. 2 , pp. 329-354 . DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12164
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
© 2015 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Brown, J. (2015), Contextualism about Evidential Support. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12164. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving
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