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dc.contributor.authorBurgess, A. E. F
dc.contributor.authorSchofield, P. G.
dc.contributor.authorHubbard, S. F.
dc.contributor.authorChaplain, Mark A. J.
dc.contributor.authorLorenzi, T.
dc.date.accessioned2016-10-07T14:30:10Z
dc.date.available2016-10-07T14:30:10Z
dc.date.issued2016-12-07
dc.identifier.citationBurgess , A E F , Schofield , P G , Hubbard , S F , Chaplain , M A J & Lorenzi , T 2016 , ' Dynamical patterns of coexisting strategies in a hybrid discrete-continuum spatial evolutionary game model ' , Mathematical Modelling of Natural Phenomena , vol. 11 , no. 5 , pp. 49-64 . https://doi.org/10.1051/mmnp/201611504en
dc.identifier.issn0973-5348
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 246489559
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 30fd94a8-83c1-4479-ba89-19f5339e9b8c
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 85002659441
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0001-5727-2160/work/55378985
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000389670900004
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/9625
dc.description.abstractWe present a novel hybrid modelling framework that takes into account two aspects which have been largely neglected in previous models of spatial evolutionary games: random motion and chemotaxis. A stochastic individual-based model is used to describe the player dynamics,whereas the evolution of the chemoattractant is governed by a reaction-diffusion equation. The two models are coupled by deriving individual movement rules via the discretisation of a taxis-diffusion equation which describes the evolution of the local number of players. In this framework, individuals occupying the same position can engage in a two-player game, and are awarded a payoff, interms of reproductive fitness, according to their strategy. As an example, we let individuals play the Hawk-Dove game. Numerical simulations illustrate how random motion and chemotactic response can bring about self-generated dynamical patterns that create favourable conditions for the coexistence of hawks and doves in situations in which the two strategies cannot coexist otherwise.In this sense, our work offers a new perspective of research on spatial evolutionary games, and provides a general formalism to study the dynamics of spatially-structured populations in biological and social contexts where individual motion is likely to affect natural selection of behavioural traits.
dc.format.extent16
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofMathematical Modelling of Natural Phenomenaen
dc.rights© 2016, ESO. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at www.mmnp-journal.org / https://dx.doi.org/10.1051/mmnp/201611504en
dc.subjectSpatial evolutionary gamesen
dc.subjectHybrid modelsen
dc.subjectRandom motionen
dc.subjectChemotaxisen
dc.subjectHawk-Dove gameen
dc.subjectSpatial patternsen
dc.subjectQA Mathematicsen
dc.subjectQH301 Biologyen
dc.subjectNDASen
dc.subject.lccQAen
dc.subject.lccQH301en
dc.titleDynamical patterns of coexisting strategies in a hybrid discrete-continuum spatial evolutionary game modelen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Applied Mathematicsen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1051/mmnp/201611504
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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