St Andrews Research Repository

St Andrews University Home
View Item 
  •   St Andrews Research Repository
  • Philosophical, Anthropological & Film Studies (School of)
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophy Theses
  • View Item
  •   St Andrews Research Repository
  • Philosophical, Anthropological & Film Studies (School of)
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophy Theses
  • View Item
  •   St Andrews Research Repository
  • Philosophical, Anthropological & Film Studies (School of)
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophy Theses
  • View Item
  • Login
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Disagreement and philosophical method

Thumbnail
View/Open
JamesCookMPhilThesis.pdf (645.8Kb)
Date
2015
Author
Cook, James
Supervisor
Brown, Jessica (Jessica Anne)
Weatherson, Brian
Metadata
Show full item record
Altmetrics Handle Statistics
Abstract
This dissertation is primarily concerned with the subjects of disagreement, argument, and the methodology of philosophy. The first chapter sets out and attempts to answer the question of what the connection between disagreement and disputing is. The second chapter is primarily a investigation into the nature of verbal disputes. The answer the chapter puts forward is that there is a justificatory relation (or at least we behave as if there is one) between disagreeing and disputing, so that, for example, if two parties do not disagree in the right way, then they (prima facie) should not dispute. In the second chapter I will look at a few theories of verbal disputes, and I will discuss some of the features such a theory should have. I go on to explicitly endorse a version of David Chalmers's theory of verbal disputes, and defend it from some potential objections. The third chapter is a defence of the method of conceptual analysis in philosophy. I introduce some potential objections to the Canberra plan style of conceptual analysis, and show how a different conception of conceptual analyses could get over these problems. The conception of conceptual analysis I argue for is heavily inspired by Rudolf Carnap's system of explication. The main way Carnapian explication would differ from the Canberra plan style of conceptual analysis is in the way that it would allow one to move further away from the original concept in analysing it, by balancing closeness to the original concept against other specific criteria.
Type
Thesis, MPhil Master of Philosophy
Collections
  • Philosophy Theses
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/9458

Items in the St Andrews Research Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

Advanced Search

Browse

All of RepositoryCommunities & CollectionsBy Issue DateNamesTitlesSubjectsClassificationTypeFunderThis CollectionBy Issue DateNamesTitlesSubjectsClassificationTypeFunder

My Account

Login

Open Access

To find out how you can benefit from open access to research, see our library web pages and Open Access blog. For open access help contact: openaccess@st-andrews.ac.uk.

Accessibility

Read our Accessibility statement.

How to submit research papers

The full text of research papers can be submitted to the repository via Pure, the University's research information system. For help see our guide: How to deposit in Pure.

Electronic thesis deposit

Help with deposit.

Repository help

For repository help contact: Digital-Repository@st-andrews.ac.uk.

Give Feedback

Cookie policy

This site may use cookies. Please see Terms and Conditions.

Usage statistics

COUNTER-compliant statistics on downloads from the repository are available from the IRUS-UK Service. Contact us for information.

© University of St Andrews Library

University of St Andrews is a charity registered in Scotland, No SC013532.

  • Facebook
  • Twitter