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dc.contributor.authorComesana, Juan
dc.contributor.authorMcGrath, Matthew
dc.date.accessioned2016-08-23T23:33:30Z
dc.date.available2016-08-23T23:33:30Z
dc.date.issued2016-04
dc.identifier215729009
dc.identifier562699a8-68be-470b-b872-583820f67033
dc.identifier84961187521
dc.identifier.citationComesana , J & McGrath , M 2016 , ' Perceptual reasons ' , Philosophical Studies , vol. 173 , no. 4 , pp. 991-1006 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0542-xen
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/9365
dc.description.abstractThe two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear (illusions, broadly speaking) or where there is no perceived object at all (hallucinations). The main problem with Phenomenalism is that it struggles with good cases: cases where everything is perfectly normal and the external object is correctly perceived, so that one’s perceptual beliefs are knowledge. In this paper we show that there is a theory of perceptual reasons that avoids the problems for Factualism and Phenomenalism. We call this view Propositionalism. We use ‘proposition’ broadly to mean the entities that are contents of beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. The key to finding a middle ground between Phenomenalism and Factualism, we claim, is to allow our reasons to be false in bad cases. Despite being false, they are about the external world, not our phenomenal states.
dc.format.extent16
dc.format.extent268025
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophical Studiesen
dc.subjectPerceptual reasonsen
dc.subjectPhenomenalismen
dc.subjectFactualismen
dc.subjectPropositionalismen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titlePerceptual reasonsen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Philosophical, Anthropological and Film Studiesen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11098-015-0542-x
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2016-08-23


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