Feminist methodologies in moral philosophy
Abstract
This thesis develops a critique of the methodology of mainstream academic moral philosophy,
based on insights from feminist and more generally anti-oppressive political thought. The thesis
consists of two parts.
In the first, I loosely characterise a certain dominant methodology of philosophy, one based
on giving an important epistemological role to existing, 'pre-theoretical' moral attitudes, such as
intuitions. I then argue that such methodologies may be critiqued on the basis of theories that
identify these moral attitudes as problematically rooted in oppressive social institutions, such as
patriarchy and white supremacy; that is, I identify these attitudes as ideological, and so a poor
guide to moral reality.
In the second part, I identify and explore of a number of themes and tendencies from
feminist, anti-racist, and other anti-oppressive traditions of research and activism, in order to draw
out the implications of these themes for the methodology of moral philosophy. The first issue I
examine is that of how, and how much, moral philosophers should use abstraction; I eventually
use the concept of intersectionality to argue for the position that philosophers need to use less, and
a different type of, abstraction. The second major theme I examine is that of ignorance, in the
context of alternative epistemologies: standpoint epistemology and epistemologies of ignorance. I
argue that philosophers must not take themselves to be well placed to understand, using solitary
methodologies, any topic of moral interest. Finally, I examine the theme of transformation in moral
philosophy. I argue that experiencing certain kinds of personal transformation may be an essential
part of developing accurate ethical views, and I draw out the political implications of this position
for the methodology of moral philosophy.
Type
Thesis, PhD Doctor of Philosophy
Rights
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