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dc.contributor.authorKatsoulacos, Yannis
dc.contributor.authorUlph, David Tregear
dc.date.accessioned2016-06-06T23:32:33Z
dc.date.available2016-06-06T23:32:33Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.citationKatsoulacos , Y & Ulph , D T 2015 , ' Legal uncertainty, competition law enforcement procedures and optimal penalties ' , European Journal of Law and Economics , vol. Online First . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-015-9504-1en
dc.identifier.issn0929-1261
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 102324900
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: 7b6ed1b3-54b4-4b1a-876b-673c442446f3
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84961192229
dc.identifier.otherORCID: /0000-0003-3171-1270/work/59464533
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000372242700001
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10023/8942
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we make three contributions to the literature on optimal Competition Law enforcement procedures. A first contribution, of more general interest, is to formalise the concept of “legal uncertainty”, relying on ideas in the literature on Law and Economics, but associating legal uncertainty with the information structure of what firms know about the process by which potentially harmful actions are treated by competition authorities. What firms know is clearly distinct, though influenced, from the phenomenon of decision errors made by authorities. We use this framework to show that information structures with legal uncertainty need not imply lower welfare than information structures with legal certainty – a result echoing a similar finding obtained in a completely different context and under different assumptions in earlier Law and Economics literature (Kaplow and Shavell, 1992). Our second contribution is to revisit and significantly generalise the analysis in our previous paper, Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009), involving a welfare comparison of Per Se and Effects-Based legal standards. In that analysis we considered just a single information structure under an Effects-Based standard and penalties were exogenously fixed. Here we allow (a) for different information structures under an Effects-Based standard and (b) for endogenous penalties. We obtain two main results. Under all information structures (including complete legal uncertainty) an Effects-Based legal standard dominates a Per Se standard. Moreover, optimal penalties may be higher when there is legal uncertainty than when there is no legal uncertainty. These conclusions run counter to a number of prescriptions by legal scholars in the recent literature.
dc.format.extent39
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofEuropean Journal of Law and Economicsen
dc.rights(c) Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015. This is the author's accepted manuscript. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10657-015-9504-1en
dc.subjectCompetition law enforcementen
dc.subjectPenaltiesen
dc.subjectLegal uncertaintyen
dc.subjectCompetition policyen
dc.subjectK Law (General)en
dc.subject.lccK1en
dc.titleLegal uncertainty, competition law enforcement procedures and optimal penaltiesen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.sponsorEconomic & Social Research Councilen
dc.description.versionPostprinten
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. School of Economics and Financeen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-015-9504-1
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden
dc.date.embargoedUntil2016-06-07
dc.identifier.grantnumberRES-062-23-2211en


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