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dc.contributor.authorCardona, D.
dc.contributor.authorPonsatí, C.
dc.identifier.citationCardona , D & Ponsatí , C 2015 , ' Representing a democratic constituency in negotiations : delegation versus ratification ' , Social Choice and Welfare , vol. 45 , no. 2 , pp. 399–414 .
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 194893404
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: f482eac1-827e-4849-b6fc-7a93701245ed
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84942191674
dc.identifier.otherWOS: 000361544400008
dc.descriptionThe authors acknowledge financial support from the Generalitat de Catalunya through grant SGR2009-1051, and from the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad through grants ECO2009-08820 and ECO2012-34046en
dc.description.abstractWe consider negotiations where one of the parties is a group that must send a representative to the bargaining table. We examine the trade-offs that the group faces in choosing between two different regimes for this representation: (i) Delegation where the representative is granted full authority to reach an agreement, and (ii) Ratification, where any agreement reached by the representative requires a posterior ratification vote. We show that when the group has flexibility—to select the delegate or to set the majority threshold for ratification—the majority of the group favors delegation. Only when the flexibility is limited or delegates are (sufficiently) unreliable will the majority of the group prefer ratification.
dc.relation.ispartofSocial Choice and Welfareen
dc.rights(c) Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015. this is the author's version of this work. The final publication is available at Springer via
dc.subjectHB Economic Theoryen
dc.subjectHV Social pathology. Social and public welfareen
dc.titleRepresenting a democratic constituency in negotiations : delegation versus ratificationen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.The University of St Andrewsen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews.School of Economics and Financeen
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden

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