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dc.contributor.authorCasati, Filippo
dc.contributor.authorFujikawa, Naoya
dc.date.accessioned2016-04-25T11:30:13Z
dc.date.available2016-04-25T11:30:13Z
dc.date.issued2016-06
dc.identifier.citationCasati , F & Fujikawa , N 2016 , ' Nonexistent objects as truth-makers : against Crane's reductionism ' Philosophia , vol. 44 , no. 2 , pp. 423-434 . DOI: 10.1007/s11406-016-9710-2en
dc.identifier.issn1574-9274
dc.identifier.otherPURE: 242180728
dc.identifier.otherPURE UUID: c738f2d9-c6ff-41a5-bc37-05ca8c962f01
dc.identifier.otherBibtex: urn:2b30abaae1fae87c022f08ef5662e070
dc.identifier.otherScopus: 84964370890
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/8673
dc.description.abstractAccording to Meinongianism, some objects do not exist but we can legitimately refer to and quantify over them. Moreover, Meinongianism standardly regards nonexistent objects as contributing to the truth-makers of sentences about nonexistent objects. Recently, Tim Crane has proposed a weak form of Meinongianism, a reductionism, which denies any contribution of nonexistent objects to truth-making. His reductionism claims that, even though we can truly talk about nonexistent objects by using singular terms and quantifiers about them, any truth about nonexistent objects is reducible to some truths about existent objects. In this paper, we critically examine the reductionism casting some doubts on the reducibility of truths of sentences like 'a winged pig is possible' or 'some winged pig does not exist' into truths about existent objects. We also argue that the truth of such sentences can be explained by adopting a strong form of Meinongianism which admits contribution of nonexistent objects to the truth-making of such sentences.en
dc.format.extent12en
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophiaen
dc.rights© The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.en
dc.subjectNonexistent objectsen
dc.subjectTruth-makeren
dc.subjectMeinongianismen
dc.subjectPossible objectsen
dc.subjectReductionismen
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)en
dc.subject.lccB1en
dc.titleNonexistent objects as truth-makers : against Crane's reductionismen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.description.versionPublisher PDFen
dc.contributor.institutionUniversity of St Andrews. Philosophyen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9710-2
dc.description.statusPeer revieweden


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